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ABSTRACT
The threat of online personal information breaches rises as people put more critical dataonline, and despite ample availability, strong authentication protecting this information isnot being adopted quickly enough to address the threat. To better understand this problem,
the IQP team designed and conducted a study to isolate factors leading to such behavior. The
team found that people had trouble surmounting the shift to stronger tools, but once past that,
they readily settled into permanent use. Also, personal connection to threats was correlated to a
good impression of strong authentication. The solution may be online security education that
induces a personal connection to the threat, so as to create a better incentive to overcome the
obstacles of transitioning and increase security.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In today’s technologically advancing society, the internet contains an incredible amount of
sensitive information. Critical data like Social Security numbers and banking information are
stored in databases accessible through the internet. Authentication for many services consists of
a simple username and password. When one uses only this to protect an account, one is subject
to a frighteningly high risk of online attacks that may leading to accounts being compromised.
The use of strong authentication methods is highly recommended to fully protect one’s accounts.
Despite this, most people do not use the stronger tools available to them. The goal of this IQP is
to identify solutions to the problems of spreading the use of Strong Authentication by studying
how people perceive and behave while using it.
This project presents the results of a study conducted to track users’ views on strong au-
thentication. The study consisted of gathering a group of individuals willing to try out a two
factor authentication, educating a portion of the subjects on the current threats and methods to
mitigate them, and requiring them to use the service for ten weeks. During this time, the subjects
filled out bi-weekly surveys to track behavior and perception. At the end of the study, all subjects
completed an exit survey to assess the experience. The data collected gave insights into how to
solve the problem of the missing widespread use of strong authentication.
The team found that individuals frequently stated that they desired increased security,
but they were unwilling or unaware of how to improve. The team also found that background
factors generally had no relation to perception of the strong security method used throughout the
study, with the notable exception of prior knowledge of Multi-Factor Authentication. Subjects
were typically happy with the security, privacy, and usability of the two factor authentication
application after the burden of installation and linking of services was complete.
This study helps explain the overall experience of using strong authentication. Improving
overall experience is pivotal to spreading the adoption of secure practices. The IQP team recom-
mends that strong authentication awareness education be given in a way that invokes a strong
personal connection to the threat, so as to help people surmount the difficulties of transitioning
to strong authentication methods.
For future related work, the team suggests more in-depth education be supplied to future
participants of a similar study. Having a larger and more diverse pool of subjects may also aid in
obtaining widespread and valuable data. One final recommendation is hosting regular meetings
with participants to further illicit reflection on perceptions.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
In the summer of 2014, J.P. Morgan Chase (JPMC), the largest bank in the United States,
experienced the worst ever cyber-attack to date. Accounts of seventy-six million households and
seven million small businesses were compromised in the attack. The hackers, who operated
overseas, were able to generate a list of applications used on the local machines at the offices
of JPMC by gaining access to an employee’s account password. Using that list, they were able
to figure out which applications were vulnerable and used them as a backdoor into JPMC’s
system (Silver-Greenberg, 2014). Despite spending $250 million each year for cyber security,
JPMC’s security team neglected to upgrade one of their network servers to use Multi-Factor
Authentication1 (MFA). This left the entire bank vulnerable to a cyber-attack (Goldstein, 2014).
Earlier in 2014, hackers comprimised Jennifer Lawrence’s iCloud account, resulting in nude
pictures and videos being exposed to the internet. The attackers gained access to her account
because they were able to bypass the MFA on iCloud. Many other celebrities were also hacked,
including Victoria Justice, Teresa Palmer, Kate Upton, and Lea Michele.
Ashley Madison, an adult dating website that assists married people engage in extramarital
affairs, was compromised in July of 2015. Hackers gained access to the database that contained
user account information, and they figured out how to decrypt all of the data. Ashley Madison
lost control of users’ names, addresses, and personal photographs. As a result, Ashley Madison’s
CEO, Noel Biderman, resigned after the third leak. The increasing frequency of stories about
corporations and individuals being hacked demonstrates a bit of the larger trend of online
security: it is not relatively strong enough to shrug off the storm of malicious attacks anymore.
1Multi-Factor Authentication: A form of strong authentication requiring the use of more than one verification
step, adding critical layers of security to user sign-ins and transactions
2
1.1. INTRODUCTION
However, there is still hope. One of the relevant protagonists in the battle for online security is
strong Authentication2
Insecure authentication is widespread and gives hackers and easy route to successfully attack
a computer system. The current standard of authentication (username and password) is not
sufficient for modern day usage. Computers are powerful enough to try every combination of
characters in a password until they break in, a method known as Brute Force3. Using brute
force, modern computers can crack any possible six character password almost instantaneously
(in 0.0024 seconds) (Kevin Forgaty, 2012). If stronger authentication were more commonly used,
J.P. Morgan Chase, Jennifer Lawrence, and countless other entities would have been far more
likely to prevent their data being breached. MFA drastically reduces online identity theft and
other forms of fraud, because even if a password is stolen, it is not enough to give an attacker
access to the system (Rouse, 2015).
There are few previously completed studies pertaining to why people do not use strong
authentication. One such study focused mainly on privacy and usability as motivation criteria,
drawing specific but inconsistent conclusions: (Weir, 2009) found that people were motivated
to use a particular method by usability and convenience rather than added security, whereas
(Christofaro, 2014) found that perception of privacy is not negatively correlated with usability,
and that perception of usability is dependent only on user background factors rather than the
specifics of an application. This discrepancy illustrates that there is still much to learn. Designing
smarter strong authentication techniques that build off of people’s motivation requires further
investigation of their incentives.
The ultimate goal of the following report is to analyze the influence on motivation to use
strong authentication of several targeted factors: awareness education, user background, and
perceptions of usability, privacy, and security. In order to address these goals, the IQP team
designed a study that recruited participants with a cash incentive and split them into two groups
with different levels of awareness education treatment: baseline and advanced education. The two
groups attended separate educational meetings where they received their differing education and
completed an initial survey, which was used to assess the participants’ background information
before education.
The IQP team required all subjects to complete five surveys sent to them on a bi-weekly
basis while they incorporated a third party Two-Factor Authentication4 (2FA) application,
Authy, into several of their online services. The aforementioned surveys were used to assess any
change in perception throughout the study and identify trends relative to background traits,
study treatments, and time. The surveys determined student’s thoughts on the usability, privacy,
and security of Authy. After the mid-study period passed, the subjects were asked to attend a
2Authentication: The process by which a computer system verifies that the claimed identity login attempt is
genuine. A common example is a username and password combination.
3Brute Force: A trial and error method used by hackers to decode encrypted data such as passwords relying on
exhaustive effort rather than employing intellectual strategies
4Two-Factor Authentication: Multi-Factor Authentication using exactly two verification steps
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final meeting, during which they completed an exit (Final) survey and received compensation for
their participation. The final survey data was used to generate an overall view of the study from
an individual’s perspective and to collect participants’ final perceptions on strong authentication.
The analysis of the results from each of the surveys suggested that education may play a
role in perception of 2FA, but not so much in user behavior. The team found that background
personal factors, such as if a subject knew someone who was hacked, or whether or not a subject
had prior knowledge of Strong Authentication, were far more likely to predict a positive behavior
or perception. Additionally, participants do not seem to accurately report their true values of the
aforementioned criteria and often think they are better off than they actually are. Many subjects
had difficulties or concerns when installing and linking their services to Authy. By the end of the
study, participants generally favored the use of 2FA, similar to how they blindly favored the use
of single factor authentication passwords at the beginning of the study.
The IQP team recommends that strong authentication methods such as 2FA should receive
more attention in the media to increase overall usage until it becomes the norm. Entities using
strong authentication may benefit by having clear, foolproof installation guides. If the barrier
to entry is too high, few will put in the work to secure themselves. Supporting more services
and/or standardizing strong authentication across platforms may also go a long way in expanding
overall usage. Additionally, the team recommends that more research be done with varying study
conditions such as having a larger number of participants, diversifying the participants, or using
a different strong authentication method like Google Authenticator. Society can benefit from
changes like these to strengthen online security.
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BACKGROUND
2.1 Overview
The following background section contains in-depth information regarding the definitions of
authentication, single and dual factor methods with examples, related work, and several other
topics including the FIDO Alliance’s work and weaknesses of two factor authentication. One
must understand these to understand the goals of this research and the methods taken in the
design of the user study.
2.2 What Is Authentication?
Authentication is the process by which a system verifies the identity of a user who wishes to
access it. The recent growth of internet technology and its associated security requirements
demand for strong authentication. Authentication can be classified three ways:
1. Verifying proof of identity by confirming a credible person’s claim who had first-hand
evidence that the identity is genuine.
2. Contrasting the attributes of the object to common knowledge about objects of that origin.
3. The last definition relies on documentation or other outside claims. For example, in com-
puter science, a user can gain access to a secure system based on provided credentials that
imply authenticity.
In computer science, verification is conducted by proving the truth of an attribute of a
particular datum (a "factor" of authentication). These factors can be split up into three categories
that cover a plethora of elements. Any number or combination of the following may be used to
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verify an individual’s identity before granting access, approving a transaction, signing a document,
granting authority to another person, or establishing a chain of power. These factors are:
1. Knowledge factors: Something a person knows, for example: passwords, person identification
number 9PIN), challenge question response, and pass phrases.
2. Ownership factors: Something a person has, for example: security token, cell phone, software
token, ID card, wrist band, and etc.
3. Inherence factors: Something a user is or does, for example: biometrics including finger-
prints, retinal patterns and etc, signatures, face, voice, and biometric identifiers.
2.3 Single Factor Authentication
Single Factor Authentication (SFA) is authentication that uses one of the three factors to identify
a user. For example, a key and lock system is a single factor authentication method because it
uses a possession factor to identify a user and give him/her access. Similarly, a fingerprint or
retinal scanner relies on the uniqueness of one’s physical body, an inherence factor. But perhaps
the most common example is the computer password, which relies on the user’s knowledge of a
correct password, a knowledge factor.
Single factor authentication has the advantage of simplicity over its stronger multiple factor
counterparts. SFA methods are quicker, easier, cheaper, and better known. Therefore, they were
the most economic choice for internet security for many years. SFA still remains the most
economic choice for home invasion security; one rarely needs to secure a household beyond a
simple lock and key. However, just as one can use a strong pair of pliers to cut through a padlock,
one can use a brute force attack on an internet security system. The difference nowadays is that
the tools and strength necessary to break a single factor authentication system on a computer
are far more commonplace and reward yielding than those required to break a padlock. SFA is
universally less secure than multi-factor methods by the nature complexity itself, but the focus
of this project is the economic disadvantages of the most relativly important SFA system: the
standard password. The significant disadvantage thereof is the lack of security.
Password authentication is becoming susceptible to breaches by brute force attacks now that
more powerful computers are more common and less expensive. To illustrate the scale of this, in
2014, a group of Russian criminals compiled a list of 1.2 billion internet username and password
combinations, including those from 500 million e-mail accounts. According to a Radicati study,
4.35 billion e-mail accounts are in existence. That means roughly 11.5% of all e-mail addresses
have been hacked mainly due to brute force attacks. This is compounded by the phenomenon of
people using the same password for multiple accounts. According to a study that BitDefender
conducted in 2010, 75% of people use the same account names and passwords on their social
networking sites as they do on their email accounts. On top of all of this, the security of password
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SFA relies on the user create a unique knowledge factor; knowledge factors tend to be less unique
than inherence and possession factors inherently, and there is little need to justify the claim
that people tend to use simple, non-unique passwords. The combination of the disadvantages
mentioned above justifies the relative risk of standard internet SFA as high, and, therefore,
uneconomic.
2.4 Dual Factor Authentication
Two Factor Authentication allows for increased security by requiring a combination of two factors.
These components can be something that a user has (a possession factor), something that a user
knows (a knowledge factor), or something that the user is (an inherence factor). An example of
one such method is a transaction at a cash register. One must swipe his/her card and also enter a
pin number to allow a debit transaction. Both the physical card and knowledge of the pin number
are required, thus satisfying the two factor requirement.
Two factor authentication primarily has the advantage of increased security over single factor
methods. A brute force attack will not work because at least one of the factors is not an entity
that can even be "guessed". Two factor authentication is even more secure when used locally and
not connected to a server; the chances of Man in the Middle Attacks are greatly reduced (A Man
in the Middle Attack occurs when a hacker uses a counterfeit "service" to deceive his/her victim
into entering personal account information). 2FA’s security is furthered by its high number of
implementation techniques. Its forms range from a password plus and inherence factor as with a
biometric scanner to a username and password plus a one-time passwords (OTP’s) sent via SMS
to a cell phone. Two factor authentication is also frequently and advantageously free on the user
end, as seen in SMS OTP and mobile application systems.
Although two factor authentication has many advantages, it comes with drawbacks. 2FA
practices using a to a server connection to distribute one of the factors are susceptible to Man
in the Middle attacks, and all 2FA is vulnerable Trojan attacks. Even so, any hacker must
overcome two factors instead of one. 2FA may also be inconvenient; separate physical devices are
sometimes used to distribute OTPs, necessitating the device’s presence when authenticating and
maintenance associated with such hardware. Additional physical devices may also be costly.
Table 2.1 shows data that approximates usage of the aforementioned authentication methods.
Figure 2.1 contains a histogram of the same data:
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Company SMS Phone call Email Hardware Software Totals
Genre Token Implementation
Backup & Sync 9 2 3 2 13 29
Banking 11 7 5 11 7 41
Cloud 5 2 0 2 14 23
Computing
Communication 7 1 1 2 8 19
Cryptocurrency 9 1 1 6 26 43
Developer 11 3 0 3 16 33
Software
Domains 10 2 0 8 24 44
Education 1 0 0 1 2 4
Email 6 1 2 4 9 22
Entertainment 1 0 0 0 0 1
Finance 3 1 1 0 2 7
Gaming 4 0 6 3 17 30
Health 2 0 1 0 3 6
Hosting/VPS 6 0 0 5 18 29
Identity 5 1 1 6 11 24
Management
Investing 3 2 1 4 3 13
Payment 7 1 1 3 6 18
Remote Access 0 0 2 1 5 8
Retail 2 0 0 1 2 5
Social 11 1 0 1 9 22
Security 3 1 1 3 8 16
Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 11 2 1 1 15 30
Totals 127 28 27 67 218 467
Table 2.1: Real World Usage of Authentication Methods: A survey of 472 companies (Davis, 2014)
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Figure 2.1: Real World Usage of Authentication Methods (Davis, 2014)
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2.5 Strong Authentication Methods
2.5.1 Network Based Authentication
SMS
SMS verification is a common network-based authentication system. This technology requires a
user with a phone signal to get access to an account by entering a one-time password (OTP) sent
to their phone via SMS after entering a username and password. The two factors in this case are
knowledge (username and password) and ownership (cell phone).
An an example of this method is Facebook using a login approval authentication system that
requires one to enter a code that Facebook sends to his/her mobile phone via SMS message when
logging in from a new IP address in addition to the standard username and password. Once
successful, the user can mark the device as approved so that he/she need not use both factors for
every future usage. Dropbox also has a similar SMS two-step verification in which a user may
elect to use to add a knowledge factor of authentication to their logins. Once a user opts in, he/she
must enter a onetime password for each login session.
SMS verification adds a second step to authentication that makes hacking into an account
significantly more difficult; if a hacker obtains or bypasses only the username and password
fields, they will still be unable to log in as they lack the Onetime Password (OTP). Furthermore,
SMS verification systems are inexpensive on the user’s side; SMS messages are typically free
with today’s standard cell phone carrier plans.
One potential problem with this method is the dependency upon one’s cellphone. The method
is ineffective when one is out of network range or if one’s phone is lost or stolen. Additionally, this
method is considered relatively insecure; SMS text messages can be intercepted or forwarded to
another phone number, which may provide a hacker with an authentication code and therefore
account access.
Email
Email verification is another common 2FA method that requires one to enter a OTP sent to
him/her by e-mail after entering a username and password. Again, this method uses two authen-
tication factors: knowledge (username and password) and ownership (email).
Valve, a videogame company and the creator of the online videogame/software catalog Steam,
uses "Steam Guard", a setting where each time one logs into one’s account on an unknon device,
one must enter an OTP sent via email. Origin, another videogame manufacturer, uses another
exemplary login verification setting: Whenever one’s account is logged into on an remote device,
a verification code will be sent to his/her contact email address and required to complete the
authentication process. E-mail verification is completely free for users and simple to implement
for developers, and thus advantageous.
However, email verification has its disadvantages. First is the typical usability complaint a
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longer login process with possible complications such as a spam filter marking and deleting the
email containing the code. Second, this method can be considered as merely an extension of a
knowledge factor rather than an ownership factor; to access one’s email, one only needs to enter
another username and password, so one can argue that using an e-mail as an authentication
step is just a longer password.
2.5.2 Authentication Without Network Connection
Embedded Devices
Another type of two-factor authentication is the embedded system random code generator. This
comes in the form of a physical device that randomly generates output codes that are required in
addition to a username and password. This satisfies the knowledge and ownership conditions of
two-factor authentication. One should note that the device is not connected to a server; it uses a
parallel algorithm to the so that the codes match.
One such embedded hardware security token is the RSA SecurID. This and similar devices
operate by having their internal clocks synced with their central servers’ clocks. Each token
with a unique seed generates a random number. The server and embedded device run matching
algorithms based on the same seeds, which results in the same value on both ends. Therefore,
the device does not communicate with the server. Rohos uses a login USB key which must be
plugged in to authenticate a user. The method further removes the complexity of learning how to
log in the system because after a single login, the software on the individual device remembers
the USB and authenticates automatically when plugged in (Cooperband, 2015).
Embedded devices typically are the most common highly secure two-factor authentication
methods. Using OTPs is extremely effective in both corporate and local logins. Because OTP
generators are offline, there is no vulnerability to an attack on a network channel such as those
that SMS and email methods use. Hardware devices are considered secure enough to use in
banking such as with Bank of America, National Bank of Abu Dhabi, the Bank of Queensland
and many more (Aloul, 2009).
Hardware token devices do have several disadvantages. Buying, supplying, maintaining, and
replacing physical devices for customers can be costly. If an individual uses several banks, he/she
might inconveniently need to purchase several expensive tokens. Additionally, learning to use
such devices may be inconvenient for those who are not technically inclined (Aloul, 2009).
Mobile Application
Companies such as Google and Twilio showcase yet another method of two-factor authentication:
the smart-device app. This method uses a smart device (i.e. cell phone or tablet) application
with a time-based one-time password algorithm (TOTP) to generate a passcode necessary for
authentication in addition to a regular account password. Thus, this method uses a knowledge
11
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
factor (the password) and a possession factor (one must physically have their smart device to
open the application) to ensure secure access.
To illustrate exactly how this works, one can use this method for verifying one’s Microsoft
account. Every time one signs in, one is required to enter a six digit 60-second iterative password
that is generated by only Google’s Authenticator app on his/her cell phone and is unique to one’s
Google/Microsoft account. This system has several advantages: First, it is versatile and can be
utilized by a variety of third-party applications. For example, Microsoft accounts can be linked to
Google’s Authenticator App or Twilio’s Authy’s application, which will be described in more depth
later. Phone applications are more secure than SMS verification or e-mail OTP systems because
they are time-based and disconnected from server connections. The disadvantages of this system
stem from the relative complexity and lack of broad usage. Google’s Authenticator and Twilio’s
Authy are the two widely used examples of the method, but many account services still do not
support either of them or 2FA in general.
Common Access Card
The common access card is a standard identification tool for active-duty military personnel and
other government employees. The common access card (CAC) is used as an authentication factor
for military and government computers and additionally for physical access to buildings, and
controlled spaces. Each CAC is encrypted using 2048-bit encryption. In some cases, the card is
used in conjunction with a personal password and others a simple pin number is required. The
card qualifies as an ownership factor (the physical CAC), and the password/pin is a knowledge
factor. Most CAC cards have an integrated circuit chip on them containing either 64 or 144
kilobytes of personal data including the password/pin for the chip. Also, CACs are also used to
encrypt emails and sign documents. Many workplaces use local networks that require a CAC
card to gain access. If a user fails to enter the password/pin a certain number of times, the CAC’s
access permissions are removed.
Some of the government employees that use the CAC include active-duty armed forces,
reservists, National Guard members, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the
United States Public Health Service, Emergency-essential employees, contingency contractor
employees, contracted ROTC cadets, deployed overseas civilians, non-combatant personnel,
DoD/uniformed service civilians residing on military installations in CONUS, Hawaii, Alaska,
Puerto Rico, and Guam, DoD/uniformed service civilians or contracted civilians living in a foreign
country for more than 365 days, Presidential appointees approved by the United States Senate,
DoD civilian employees, United States military veterans with a Veterans Affairs Disability rating
of 100%, Eligible Contractor Employees, and non-DoD/other government and state employees of
the National Guard.
The CAC’s usage is not limited to enter protected systems. It can also be used as an all-in-one
card. The chip technology may also be used as identification or as a credit or debit card: integrated
circuit chips are more secure than traditional magnetic strips. However, embedded integrated
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circuit chips are fragile and known to malfunction with minor wear. Even if the contacts on the
chip are dirty, a reader may not recognize it. If the CAC is locked due to failed password attempts,
the owner cannot use the card until they visit a RAPIDS facility. Finally, in order to authenticate
for the first time, one must have access to the computer’s parent active directory. A soldier in the
field would not be able to gain access to a new computer not prepared with his/her CAC unless
there were some means of direct access to the active directory.
Biometrics
Biometric methods for authentication have been introduced over the past few years and are
starting to gain attention for their ability to use unique factors. Some of these methods include
measuring hand-writing variables (pressures, writing speeds, etc.), analyzing typing patterns,
scanning irises (which turn out to be incredibly unique and unlikely to return false positives),
fingerprints, examining hand/palm geometry, vocal features, and facial features. Fingerprint
verification is the most widely used biometric authentication system due to its simplicity and
accuracy. Several of these methods are used as 1FA, but recently, mobile applications have started
to require a pin number additionally for real two-factor authentication wherein the biometric is
considered an inherence factor and the pin number is a knowledge factor.
Recently, startup companies have begun to use biometrics to make ensure security in their
products. The Nymi Band, made by Bionym, is a heartbeat tracking bracelet that verifies identity
by the characteristics of one’s heartbeat. Myris, made by Eyecorp, scans the human iris to
authenticate users. Fingerprint scanning hardware on recent smartphone models has made
biometric identification possible for mobile applications such as Venmo and Discover.
Inherence factors inherently cannot be lost, stolen, hacked, duplicated, or shared. A user
cannot "forget" an inherence factor, thus bypassing any potentially vulnerable password recovery
procedure. On the other hand, biometric systems can never be 100% accurate. One must provide
the device with a sample which may take a long time and require expensive equipment to analyze,
and record inaccurate information depending on the device. Often, these devices are sophisticated,
fragile, and expensive.
2.6 Related Work
There is not a large amount of extensive research on two-factor and strong authentication, and
several cases have opposing results. Weir et al. (2009) explores the usability of several two-factor
banking authentication token devices. They compare the use of push button and card-activated
tokens and the chip/pin method. According to their findings, the push button token was the
simplest to use while still maintaining security, but the card-activated token was also found to be
usable and secure when in default mode. The PIN entry method was the least popular due to
subjects failing to see the security payoff of the work required to receive the additional passcode.
Users were motivated to use a particular method by usability and convenience rather than added
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security, although a small population was willing to sacrifice usability for added security: nine
people (18% of the study) chose the other methods as their preference (Weir et al., 2009).
Similarly, Cristofaro et al. (2014) present a study that surveyed 219 Mechanical Turks
to analyze experiences with popular 2FA technologies such as OTP generating tokens, email
and SMS PINs, and smartphone apps. They also measure how perceived usability impacts
motivation. Their research concludes that user perception of 2FA usability is positive and
dependent on personal background and not the specific the system. Furthermore, the study claims
that perception of privacy is not negatively correlated with usability in contrast to expectations
and previous research (Cristofaro et al,. 2014).
Another study by Krol et al. (2015) investigates UK banks’ use of 2FA. They conducted
interviews, collected entries from study subject logs over 11 days, and analyzed the data both
qualitatively and quantitatively. Their findings are in line with the research Weir et al. conducted:
2FA is not difficult to use in the short term, but user effort, more specifically the need to remember
credentials or carry addition devices, presented issues. Their subjects found biometrics to be
ideal, as they do not require memorization or possession of physical tokens (Krol et al., 2015).
Strouble et al. (2009) present a focused conclusion on impressions of the U.S. Military’s
Common Access Card (CAC). They produced an extensive survey throughout the U.S. Air Force
and attempted to understand their experiences during the transition from SFA to the CAC system.
Their analysis concludes that the change negatively affected users’ productivity and the overall
network usability. During the transition, 66% of the users lost their CAC cards, and the Air Force
lost over 260 person-years of productivity as well as $10.4 million (Strouble et al., 2009).
Clarke and Furnell emphasize problems with PIN-based authentication in their study (2005).
They argue that the growth of cell phone functionality and accessible services demand stronger
authentication. In their study, one third of their participants refused to use PIN authentica-
tion, and problems were reported for those that did. Subjects much preferred to use biometric
authentication (Clarke et al., 2005).
2.7 Fido Alliance
The FIDO Alliance is an organization whose mission is to strengthen the current state of online
authentication and assist in the adoption of strong authentication across services. Their goals
thereby are to foster a decline in the reliance on simple password authentication and foment
the creation of regulations to raise security standards. FIDO also aims to address the lack of
interoperability in strong authentication devices. FIDO has published two proposed protocols:
the UAF, which sets the standard for inherence factors that are used in replacement of passwords
for an acceptable level of strong authentication, and U2F, which sets a standard for two factor
methods by requiring authentication via a dongle/USB plugged into a computer in addition to a
password (Fido Alliance, 2015).
14
2.8. DUAL FACTOR AUTHENTICATION FAILURES
The Universal Authentication Framework (UAF) protocol allows for FIDO’s vision of a
password-less experience in which a user must register his/her account to an online service
through a local biometric authentication mechanism. UAF argues that a single inherence factor
provides enough security to remove the need for a password altogether. FIDO’s second protocol,
Universal Two Factor (U2F), contains Fido’s vision of an ideal dual factor authentication system
through a readily accessible possession factor (Fido Alliance, 2015).
Both of FIDO’s protocols require public key cryptography technology. Public and private key
pairs are created upon registration to with an online service such that FIDO holds the private
key and registers the public key with the account service. A client is only given access after
authenticating locally, upon which FIDO’s challenge is signed, verifying the customer’s identity
(Specifications Overview, n.d.).
FIDO strives toward three goals for their standards: ease of use, privacy, security. They hope
that by standardizing protocol, clients will better be able to adopt strong authentication to the
internet a safer place (Fido Alliance, 2015).
2.8 Dual Factor Authentication Failures
Though Dual Factor Authentication is generally more secure than Single Factor Authentication, it
is still subject to attacks. One such attack is described in When Organized Crime Applies Academic
Results, published by researchers at the École Normale Supérieure university (Greenberg, 2015).
A widely used 2FA application is the credit card chip and pin combination. In this system, one
inserts his/her credit card into a card reader. They enter their PIN number into the card reader’s
interface, and the reader queries the card to see if the PIN is correct. The card sends back the
corresponding positive or negative response based on the inputted attempt (Ferrardi, 2015).
The system, however, is vulnerable to a "man in the middle attack": one can use a separate
device or chip installed into the card to preempt the query response sent back to the card reader
with a message sent from the hacking chip, which can force a "yes" message regardless of the
PIN number queried to the card. All the chip needs to do is listen for messages sent to the card.
Cambridge University Researchers detailed this vulnerability in 2010 and created a proof of
concept example of this system using an FPGA. In 2011, a group of French citizens implemented
this system and managed to steal and use about $680,000. The criminals used stolen credit
cards on which they installed chips with the desired functionality. Unfortunately, this method of
spoofing is difficult to detect because a legitimate or fraudulent transaction will appear the same
to the card reader at any teller, and the individual using the card does not identify him/herself.
A notable point is that this attack overcomes only the knowledge factor. The thieves had to
physically steal a credit card. Therefore, an attack may be nulled by an individual canceling
his/her credit account after his/her card disappears. The card will be internally wiped, and card
readers will not recognize it.
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A potential fix for this attack is to have the card reader require signature verification to
ensure the query response message is coming from the correct chip. Another solution proposed
by many banks is to have the card reader send a preliminary query with a default response
of "not accepted" immediately upon establishing a connection. The expected response is "not
accepted" because the pin number would not have been sent yet. If "accepted" is the answer, the
card must have been tampered with, and the reader may cancel the transaction. However, this
implementation is still subject to further exploitation if the attacker is clever enough.
Another 2FA system known to have been successfully compromised by attackers is Mobile
Transaction Authentication Number (mTAN) technology, a variation of TAN technology often
used by banks. TAN technology is used when a bank allocates and distributes a specific number
of single-use TANs to a user. The user then utilizes a TAN as an authentication factor for a bank
transaction. mTAN technology is a more specific TAN method that distributes the TAN to a
mobile device be means of an SMS message.
The vulnerabilities in this system are showcased mainly with online banking systems and
have led to a series of frauds with several companies. An attack can be conducted by gaining
account information through keyloggers or phishing software to impersonate a victim and
obtaining a SIM card to their phone from a mobile network operator (Betrüger knacken Online-
Konten, 2015). The SIM card is used to receive mTANs that the victim requests from that point
onwards. The victim may recognize that they are not receiving an mTAN from their cellular
provider and get the issue resolved, but until then, the attacker can use mTANs they received
to make fraudulent transactions. One can prevent this from happening by using anti-spyware
software, and cellular networks could avoid repercussions by implementing a more rigorous
system for replacing SIM cards.
2.9 Statistical Tests Background Information
The analysis portion of this study uses three types of statistical tests: T-Tests, one-way ANOVA,
and two-way ANOVA Tests.
The type of T-Test that the team used was a Two Sample T-Test assuming unequal variances
between populations. Also known as an Aspin-Welch Test or the Satterthwaite method, this
theorem works under the assumption that the distributions of the populations are normal and
allows one to test the difference between sample means where the population variances are not
known and may not be equal. As a result, there are fewer degrees of freedom in this test than
in a test when one assumes the variances are equal. The team used these tests to check for
significance with responses between 2 categories or treatments only when the responses were on
a scale. The equation for this test is (Hintze, 2005):
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A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, or factorial analysis, tests for significance
between the means of independent groups. This is useful for data where the sample populations
are divided and given two or more unrelated "treatments", or in other cases where a numerical
mean cannot represent the average of qualitative ideas. The two-way ANOVA tests builds off of
the one-way by adding another independent variable. It tests for significance between two factors
and then interaction between the two factors, and is again useful for testing between treatments
over survey number. Here is a summary of relevant formulae (Explorable.com, 2009):
FactorA : SSa =
∑
i
(xi− x)2
FactorB : SSb =
∑
j
(x j− x)2
Interaction : SSab =
∑
i
∑
j
(xi j− xi− x j+ x)2
d. f .a = (rows−1), d. f .b = (columns−1), and d. f .ab = (r−1)(c−1)
Finally,
MSa = SSad fa
, MSb =
SSb
d fb
, and MSab =
SSab
d fab
where SSi is the sum of squares, a and b are the two factors, xi is the mean of sample i, and
MSi is a measure of significance that is compared to a critical value to calculate the P value of
the test.
2.10 Authy
The mobile application Authy provides strong authentication through several methods. Authy
consolidates the storage of authentication tokens for multiple services, and makes them available
for a phone app, desktop app, or laptop. With the goal of making it easy for anyone to use two
factor authentication, Authy’s verification process conforms easily with everyday activities. Authy
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is also capable of working across apps that function with Google Authenticator. Authy was an
ideal 2FA system to use in this IQP’s user study because of its straightforwardness and broad
compatibility across services. The IQP team has even elected to personally use Authy, and they
believe it provides adequate security without being much of a hassle.
2.10.1 Advantages and Disadvantages
Authy has many advantages such as: supporting 2FA compatible sites like Facebook, Google,
Dropbox, etc., allowing the application on multiple devices such as PC, tablet, and smartphones.
It may also help a user retrieve a lost account; Authy backs up every 2FA token ID in its cloud.
Authy also has some disadvantages, including a complicated user interface compared to SFA
methods, and user privacy concerns such as sharing users’ private information under subpoena.
However, most companies do this so it is not uncommon or a particularly large concern.
2.10.2 Capabilities
Authy offers several variations of its 2FA app: Authy Onetouch sends a push notification to one’s
cell phone/device upon request of login or transaction. The user then can simply approve it with
their cell phone without the need to enter a code. Authy Softtoken uses a 20-second iterative one
time password generated on the Authy app on a smartphone/device that one is required when
requesting to login/transact with a website. Lastly, Authy Onecode sends a one-time password via
SMS to one’s cell phone/device that is required gain access to a sponsored site. Authy is currently
supported by 19 large services, including Facebook, Google, Dropbox, Amazon, and Microsoft.
2.10.3 Important Services that Authy Provides
An important service that Authy brings to the user is inherited trust. Under this model an already
"trusted" device can extend this "trust" to another device, meanin that a user can authorize any
other device to access his accounts from an authorized device - the new device can also further
extend trust to other devices. When a device is lost, one can simply use another device to access
one’s accounts. Furthermore, if one purchases a new device, he/she can simply use the old device
to authorize the new one instantly.
2.10.4 Privacy
Authy prides itself on being a private service that records as little data as possible about the
user. Authy uses a one-time passcode algorithm which can either be a Hash Based Message
Authentication Code - One Time Pass Code (HOTP) or a Time Based One Time Pass Code (TOTP).
Both algorithms are similar in that they both require a seed and a counter to create the next
passcode. HOTP will increment a counter when the user uses a passcode or requests one, whereas
TOTP will increment a counter regarding a time variable. When a user enters Authy and submits
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a PIN to the server, the server will search for the user’s seed and calculate the value based on
the timestamp of the request and then generate a passcode. If the passcode entered on the user
end matches the server’s version, then access is granted. The algorithim is almost impossible
to break because the seed data is unkown. However, if the server were breached, and a hacker
gained entry into the database, they could gain access to previous PINs and generate the proper
formula to gain entry into an account.
2.10.5 Security
In Authy, security is ensured through a two factor authentication process. In this process, one’s
username and password serve as the knowledge factor, and one’s cell phone with the application
serve as a posession factor. Authy generates a one time passcode, and the user is required to
enter this passcode into the service to gain access. The user has thirty seconds to enter the token
before a new OTP is generated.
This one time passcode is created by a seed that is generated on registration of the service
onto Authy. This seed is based on unique aspects of one’s individual device. Authy also has a
database that stores this seed and generates the same token in time with the token generated on
one’s device. This process allows the app to be disconnected from any network, allowing for more
secure authentication.
2.10.6 Usability
Authy not only provides powerful two factor authentication security, but it also supports users as
much as possible. Authy supports most platforms from iPhone and Android to IOS and Windows.
It is easy to migrate tokens from one device to another. Because Authy uses the cloud to store
tokens, users need not need panic if the authentication devices is lost. Additionally, internet
connection is not necessary; Authy generates its OTP’s offline without a network connection.
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METHODOLOGY
3.1 Overview
To address the goal of finding out what influences people’s decisions to use strong authentication,
the IQP team designed a study that collects data from users to determine how user behavior and
impressions of two-factor authentication are affected by four criteria: usability, security, privacy,
and prior informational exposure to strong authentication and its benefits of mitigating online
threats.
To gather data discerning user perceptions for the criteria as mentioned earlier, the team
distributed surveys to the subjects throughout the study, either by e-mail or during a physical
meeting. To determine how prior exposure to two-factor authentication affects users’ perceptions
and behavior, the IQP team randomly assigned participants into two groups, both of which
received a baseline informative briefing about the definition of two-factor authentication and
several examples. One of these groups, however, was exposed to a higher level of information
about cyber security threats and how strong authentication mitigates security-associated risks.
The team’s expectation was that participants’ reactions to the different conditions between the
two study groups would be reflected in the results of the surveys.
The study was designed around four phases: recruitment, introduction, bi-weekly usage
tracking, and a final outgoing perception survey coupled with the monetary payment. All of the
information gathered was used to give insight into participants’ decision-making processes and
motivations to use strong authentication.
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of Our Study
3.2 Phase 0: Recruiting
The first step within the user study was obtaining participants. This happened during the
first two weeks of WPI’s B-term. Subjects were incentivized with a cash payment of $40 to be
distributed at the end of the study. Advertisements for the study were networked through two
channels, as modeled by Figure 3.1 and explained in depth below.
The study could have involved up to 3 audiences: WPI Students, WPI faculty, and students
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enrolled in Worcester Consortium schools. The team decided that the most feasible of these was
WPI Students. The scope of audiences was limited by ethical inspection procedures and the
unfeasibility of consistent communication with people outside of the student body. Even though
this was a thin slice of the general population, the team could still learn about the motivations of
this generation and how to incentivize them to use stronger methods.
The first recruitment channel was two introductory economics classes. The IQP team pre-
sented a short pitch of the user study which consisted of a slide show (found in Appendix A) during
the classes. The team advertised $40 in cash and a better understanding of stronger security
practices as the incentives for participation and explained the goals of the study to ensure that
participation was understood to be a mutually beneficial exchange. The team briefly introduced
the potential participants to Authy to give them a quick example of a secure authentication
method and additionally preview the application used throughout the study. Students were told
the requirements to receive compensation at the end of the study to give them a clear picture
of what was expected from them. Lastly, the IQP team showed a timeline of the requirements
to give a time-based reference regarding the duration of the project. A sign up sheet with fields
for name and e-mail address was passed around the classes to gather contact information for
interested students.
The second recruitment channel was a pre-planned chain of e-mail aliases chosen for their
reach to a broad variety of the student population. A pitch similar to those given in the classes
and an invitation coupled with the link to the sign up spreadsheet to the information sessions
was included in an advertisement e-mail to the following on-campus group aliases:
• nsbenews@wpi.edu - National Society of Black Engineers
• news4shpe@wpi.edu - Society of Hispanic Professional Engineers
• hcsa@wpi.edu - Hispanic and Caribbean Student Association
• wpibsu@wpi.edu - Black Student Union
• brasa@wpi.edu - Brazilian Student Association
• sase@wpi.edu - Society of Asian Scientists and Engineers
• connectionsprogram@wpi.edu - Connections Program
• insight16@wpi.edu - New Student Orientation insight team
• riley1st@wpi.edu - Riley Hall First Floor Freshmen Residents
Study participation was granted by the IQP team on a first come-first serve basis to those who
expressed interest and signed up to register for an info session. The team confirmed participation
with a signed consent form that stated the participants’ requirements to qualify for receipt of the
monetary compensation.
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3.3 Phase 1: Introduction
3.3.1 Participation Confirmation, Group Splitting, and Initial Survey
The potential participants who signed up for an info session were randomly assigned to either
the “control” (baseline education) or the “treatment” (advanced education) group and invited to
that group’s corresponding series of info sessions. To participate in the study, subjects had to
choose among one of three dates that the team made available from 6:00 - 7:00 p.m. The IQP
team conducted each group’s meetings simultaneously, but in different locations, on the three
separate nights. The information sessions had three purposes: To confirm participation in the
study using the aforementioned signed consent form, to conduct an initial survey to determine
prior knowledge about authentication practices, and to subject each group to an educational
presentation as described below. The IQP team referenced back to the initial information once
the study was completed for comparisons before/after exposure to the educational material.
The initial survey (Found in Appendix D) contains questions with varying purpose: Questions
1-2 Ask for student demographic information to assess the correlation of other results with
academic major and class year. Question 3 asks for an e-mail address for identification, and to
which the bi-weekly surveys were sent. Questions 5-6 assess participant’s prior knowledge of both
standard and strong authentication methods so as to create a reference point to compare with
the final survey’s questions. Questions 7 and 9 assesses single factor authentication behavioral
tendencies, while 8, 10, and 11 ask directly about single factor authentication impressions and
the importance of security to the user. If a user expresses a high value for internet account
security and does not think that a mere password is safe, then it would follow that they would
favor the stronger authentication methods in their behavior, such as using application/account
specific passwords. Questions 12 and 13 assess user’s values and tendencies towards internet
privacy, the second criteria of determination in the study. Question 14, again, determines the
users’ impression of the security of single factor authentication. The last question, 15, asks the
user how much time they would be willing to spend on different types of accounts (banking vs.
social media vs. email, etc.) to gain more reinforcement on the user’s overall value of security and
privacy in online accounts.
3.3.2 Baseline Education
The baseline presentation (Found in Appendix B) exposed the control study group to some basic
concepts about authentication and a description of the study. The IQP team first introduced the
definition of authentication and the three factors to provide a basic educational understanding
and went into further detail in explaining knowledge, ownership, and inherence factors and gave
examples about each factor to reinforce the concepts as mentioned earlier (slides 1-3). The team
then defined single factor authentication and provided the anecdote of computer passwords to
allow for a practical connection to the theoretical definitions (slide 4).
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Afterward, the team defined two-factor authentication, followed by more examples including
Google Authenticator, and fingerprint scanning on iPhones (slides 5-6). The team then introduced
Authy, explained how it works (inclusive of all 3 Authy applications), and listed the compatible
internet account services to provide a basic understanding of the use (slides 7-8). The team
further explained the goal of the user study so as to be transparent about our incentives, and then
ended the informational session with a detailed description of the participants’ requirements in
the study so as to explain the qualifications for receipt of monetary compensation (slides 9-10).
3.3.3 Advanced Education
The variable group of participants received a more advanced educational briefing that contained
not only the information presented in the baseline education presentations but also further
information on the field of cyber security. They were briefed on the importance of increased
internet security, exposed to several examples of security failures, and saw examples of how two-
factor authentication is being used in larger organizations to mitigate security risks. Additionally,
they saw Authy’s privacy policy and the amount of data Authy collects through the application.
The purpose of the advanced education was to provide a sophisticated understanding of the
risks that two-factor authentication mitigates corresponding to the question “why use strong
authentication?”, and to provide a comparative perspective on users’ perceptions when exposed
to greater information than the control group.
The treatment group of participants received a more advanced educational briefing that
contained not only the information presented in the baseline education presentations but also
further information on the field of cyber security. They were briefed on the importance of increased
internet security, exposed to several examples of security failures, and saw examples of how two-
factor authentication is being used in larger organizations to mitigate security risks. Additionally,
they saw Authy’s privacy policy and the amount of data Authy collects through the application.
The purpose of the advanced education was to provide a sophisticated understanding of the
risks that two-factor authentication mitigates corresponding to the question “why use strong
authentication?”, and to provide a comparative perspective on users’ perceptions when exposed
to greater information than the control group.
In the advanced education presentation, the IQP team introduced the cyber-security field
and some of the real world issues that pertain to it. We presented statistics about what most
computer hacking victims have in common regarding authentication and showed how vulnerable
information can be on the cloud. This allowed the participants to gain more of an understanding
as to why strong authentication exists. The team then introduced the concept of authentication
in software and the differences between single and dual factor authentication and proceeded to
show real world examples of dual factor authentication. We mentioned some of the user bases
and then we introduced the intent of the project. The team explained what Authy is, how it works,
and the application’s privacy policy for the test subjects. Finally, we explained to the subjects the
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remaining tasks for the project.
The team started the presentation by showing the test subjects information about their
likelihood to be targeted by cyber attacks and how even a small amount of effort can keep them
safer, the purpose being to ensure the treatment group subjects were exposed to the current
security risk of having simple account authentication and why companies such as Authy are
taking measures for stronger authentication (slide 2). The team then introduced five real-world
hacking incidents that happened between 2007 and 2015 to gain the concern of the treatment
group subjects. Educational material was reiterated to portray that security is imperative for
safety. The team educated the users on the definition and explanation of authentication (slide
4). The team realized that this is a simple concept, but it is something that the ordinary person
does not usually think about, so the presentation showed the three factors and explained how
most people merely use one factor. The statement that single factor authentication is no longer
all that secure was said, reinforcing the educational message that strong authentication is more
secure than single factor. The team introduced the concept of going further and using two factors
for authentication (slide 5). The team used a diagram to present this and vocally explained how
two same-factor prompts for information such as the combination of a password and a security
question is not dual factor authentication because the factors must be unique. A medium for
dual factor authentication was then shown (slide 6). The team presented the example of how
government employees use the Common Access Card in conjunction with their usual password for
authentication. This anecdote serves to expand the treatment group’s practical understanding of
the educational content. The team introduced the concept of biometric authentication techniques
and provided the example of the iPhone 6’s fingerprint reader (slide 7). Then the most familiar
form of 2FA was introduced: the team explained how the ownership and knowledge factors
associated with a hardware token qualify the method as dual factor. The team made it clear
that the token has no internet connection to the actual authentication system (slide 8) (so that if
someone were to hack a user using this, they would need to know the password and steal the
actual physical token).
The IQP team showed participants two more common forms of two-factor authentication:
email and SMS verification (slide 9). The team used the familiar example of a service that
ensures your identity by requiring that you have access to an e-mail account or that you own
your mobile phone. These examples served as further educational reinforcement tools to ensure
understanding. Study members showed contemporary 2FA usage examples among universities,
the government, and organizations in the private sector (slide 10). The purpose of these anecdotes
was to give credibility to the claim that two-factor authentication works; if another school uses
it, it has as much merit as that school has. Then exactly why the IQP team was conducting the
study and our intent was explained. The team summarized what it was trying to learn and what
the subjects will learn. This gives a positive feeling and further motivation for completion of the
study and explains the IQP team’s incentives. Then Authy was introduced Authy for the first
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time: the team showed a picture of Authy, explained its limitations and how Auth is used, and
showed how it is compatible with many common services and is easy to adopt into accounts (slide
12). This slide’s purpose was to familiarize participants with the application they would be using
for the next ten weeks. Author’s privacy policy was explained, and the participants were told
what they are potentially becoming involved (slide 13). The team explained how Authy follows
the standard regulations and how, just like most companies, it cannot guarantee one’s privacy
for some situations. The purpose of this information was to provide an educational background
on the study criterion of Privacy and how it relates to Authy. The team then described all the
data that Authy collects and explains how Authy records browser information and cookies to
help the company (slide 14). The idea was that the treatment group subjects would be aware and
better informed on the study criterion of privacy. The team then listed exactly what Authy does
with any data it collects (slide 15); the team explained to the subjects that if there is a subpoena
to Authy, they will disclose any necessary information. This further reinforces the educational
background of privacy given to the treatment group. The team went into further depth about the
legal requirements and circumstances that would allow Authy to disclose information, once again
furthering educational content about privacy (slide 16). Finally, the team ended the presentation
by describing the overall plan for the test subjects. Everything participants must do to qualify for
obtaining compensation was then clearly defined to participants. The team asked the subjects for
questions and concluded the informational session.
3.4 Phase 2: Data Gathering and Behavior Tracking
3.4.1 Bi-Weekly Tracking
Once the two groups’ education phases were completed, all participants were asked to install
Authy for two services out of the services that Authy supports. Throughout the rest of B-term,
winter break, and the first week of C-term (ending at Martin Luther King Jr. Day), all participants
were required to complete a Google survey sent out by e-mail every other weekend. They had
from Friday morning until Sunday evening to complete the questionnaire. If a participant failed
to fill out the survey, the next step was to discontinue them from the study (at the IQP team’s
discretion). The surveys tracked user behavior in the realm of usage and problems as well as
observations on privacy, security, and usability. The first two of these surveys emphasize proper
installation on all of the services the IQP team asks participants to install Authy. The third and
all following identical surveys focus on continued usage and observation.
The online surveys (Found in Appendix D) had several types of questions: some geared
towards user behavior and others geared towards user observation; all of which were based on the
study’s criteria. For the Mid-Study Evaluation I, Question 1 identifies the user via participation
number. Question 2 asks the participant which two services they installed Authy for to assess
how the installations went to determine behavior tendencies, the idea being that if a participant
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did not install Authy on two services as we asked, they must have either had problems or did not
want to continue. Question 3 asks whether or not the installations ran smoothly and redirects to
these two questions if not: 4 asks that services presented problems, and 5 asks for a description
of the problem. This series of three questions assesses the usability of Authy using catching
the people who had trouble installing it on their own. Question 6 is another behavior tracking
question to determine relative levels of motivation towards Anthy and installation success, which
we assume correlates with the criteria of usability. Questions 7 - 9 directly ask the participant for
any observations on their perceptions of security, usability, and privacy to directly assess those
criteria. Question 10 is an open-ended paragraph where any user may ask any question or make
the IQP team aware of any concern. The responses to the online surveys were linked to a Google
spreadsheet for analysis.
The Mid-Study Evaluation 2 survey is similar to the first online questionnaire, with a few
changes: It asks for current usage of Authy to determine user behavior later on in the study,
it asks for relative usage of Authy within the services to possibly find correlations with the
specific accounts for which Authy was installed, and it gives the same opportunities to report
problems and observations that the first online survey included. The Mid-Study Evaluations
III-V surveys change only the wording in several of the questions and no longer assesses current
Authy account usage (However, they do still ask about usage frequency). The IQP team members
made themselves accessible via e-mail for questions and any help with an installation that was
needed. The number and names of people who failed to install Authy were also recorded for later
analysis.
3.5 Phase 3: Study Completion
3.5.1 Information Recall
During the first week of C-term, all study participants reconvened in a classroom for a debriefing
session with the IQP team. They were given the final survey and asked to complete it. The IQP
team also asked for general impressions about the study itself, and how well it collected and
tracked perceptions and behavior. Upon completion of this debriefing session, all participants
were dismissed from the survey and immediately received their monetary compensation of $40.
The Final Survey’s questions (found in Appendix D) differ slightly from those of the initial
survey, their purpose being to discover if the study groups answered perception and behavior
questions differently. Question 1 is an identification question by participant number to track study
groups and find correlations. Question 2 asks for the overall security of two-factor authentication
about an internet password 1FA method. Question 3 assesses participant’s perceptions of security
as provided by Authy about a strong password to find correlations between the study’s security
criterion. Question 4 likewise evaluates usability, and 5 assesses confidence in privacy. Question 6
is an open-ended question to determine how knowledge of 2FA, particularly among the treatment
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group, changes perceptions of authentication. Question 7 asks for users to explain if and why
they stopped using Authy for any reason to potentially connect their lack of usage to one of the
four study’s criteria. Questions 8, 12, and 13 assess user behavior that is expected to occur when
the user has positive impressions of two-factor authentication. Question 10 is a direct attempt to
evaluate the user’s most basic perceptions of 2FA, which could be a result of any combination of
the four study criteria and their relative importance to the user. Questions 9 and 11 assess the
final level of knowledge of strong authentication methods; 9 by a quiz-like question about how
Authy protects users, and 11 by asking the user if they think they learned anything new.
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RESULTS
4.1 Overview
In order to understand how people interact with Strong Authentication, the team analyzed
the factors that affect these by conducting a 10 week long study, as described in detail by the
Methodology. Subjects attended meetings where they completed the initial survey, took part
in one of two prescribed educational sessions, and installed Authy. For the next 10 weeks, the
subjects used the app in their daily lives and filled out 5 biweekly surveys sent by the team. Lastly,
the remaining participants attended a final meeting, received the advertised compensation for
their time, and completed the final survey.
This section presents the results of the study in the order that the data was received, and
discusses its potential interpretations.
4.2 Basic Information
At the beginning of WPI’s B-term, the IQP team held three info sessions: Wednesday, November
4th, 2015, Thursday, November 5th, 2015 and Monday, November 8th, 2015. The participants
arrived in two separate classrooms and thus were split into a baseline and advanced education
group. These groups were to complete the initial survey and receive education. After the three
info sessions, sixty-one participants had joined the study; thirty-four in the advanced group and
twenty-seven in the baseline group. Next, the team sent out the mid-study surveys every other
week. The dates for these are as follows: Mid-Study Evaluation 1 was due on Sunday, November
22, 2015, Mid-Study Evaluation 2 on Sunday, December 6, Mid Study Evaluation 3 on Sunday,
December 20, Mid-Study Evaluation 4 on Sunday, January 3, 2016, and Mid-Study Evaluation
5 on January 17. In the first week of WPI’s C-term, the team held 2 closing sessions, held on
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Tuesday, January 19, 2016 and Wednesday, January 20. At the time of the final survey, forty-one
participants had completed all of the surveys; twenty-three were from the advanced group, and
eighteen were from the baseline group.
4.3 Statistical Tests
The following analysis uses three types of statistical tests: T-Tests, single factor ANOVA, and two
factor ANOVA Tests. These tests corresponded to three types of data: data on a scale with two
samples/sample groups, data with responses that are not on a scale in two sample groups, and
data with responses not on a scale and in three categories. The term “on a scale” refers to data
categorized on a scale where the number rank is a direct representation of a subject’s opinion,
or data that has only two possible values (e.g. 1 vs. 0, or perhaps “Subject favors usability” vs.
“Subject does not favor usability). The team routinely numerically categorized responses for
analysis, after testing the accuracy of each team-mates’ quantification on a small sample.
The team used a two-sample T-Test assuming unequal variance (using the two-tailed P value)
to test for significance within responses between two categories or treatments only when the
responses were on a scale. When responses are not on a scale and average, the comparison of the
averages is irrelevant. For these situations and comparing two factors, the team used a single
factor ANOVA test, also known as a factorial analysis test. When comparing three factors (for
example Time, Education level, and Perception of Security), the team used a two factor ANOVA
test (assuming overlap between samples) to determine statistical significance.
4.4 Initial Survey
4.4.1 Class Distribution
In the Initial Survey, subjects answered questions designed to identify participants and gather
demographic and study-related information. The first relevant question asked the students to
identify their academic major, for the purpose of demographic information. Similarly, students
were asked for their class year. Figure 4.1 is a graph presenting class year information of the
participant pool. Figure 4.1 shows that the majority of the participants are sophomores and
juniors. There are a fair amount of seniors and a small amount of freshmen.
4.4.2 Prior Knowledge of Authentication
In order to gauge subjects’ initial knowledge of authentication for comparison to later results, the
initial survey asked them to define computer account information in their own words.
The team quantitatively classified the data into three categories depending on the accuracy
of the response. A majority of the participants already had an understanding of authentication.
Some of the participants understood something about the concept but failed to adequately explain
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Figure 4.1: Results to the first question in the initial survey: "In which class are you?".
it. Finally, a handful had absolutely no idea what authentication was. The overall result had a
higher proportion of prior knowledge than expected, likely because the participants are generally
well educated and technically inclined as students of an engineering university.
The team assessed each subjects’ prior experience or knowledge with multi-factor authentica-
tion under the hypothesis that if one knows about strong authentication, one may be more likely
to be stronger in other behavioral factors.
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Figure 4.2: Responses to "Define computer au-
thentication in your own words?" which was
given in the initial survey.
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Figure 4.3: Results to "Do you know what
Multi-Factor Authentication is?" which was
asked in the initial survey.
In figure 4.3, one can see that the majority of participants had no knowledge about multi-
factor authentication. Individuals without this knowledge come into the study knowing little
about the field of authentication and resultingly may have radically different perceptions of how
it should work, the different factors, and topics in the field.
31
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
4.4.3 Acquaintance with Someone Hacked
An individual having an encounter with a security attack could greatly impact their security
practices. If hacked, a user could strengthen the security of the different services that they
have. This experience with hacking can cause a person to be aware of the important information
that they might have stored in some service. This occurrence makes it worthwhile to ask if an
individual has or knows someone close to them who has experienced a computer account being
hacked or compromised.
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Figure 4.4: Results to "Have you or has a family member of yours ever experienced a computer
account being hacked or compromised?" given in the initial survey.
Figure 4.4 shows the number of participants with negative hacking experience by category.
The team hypothesized that this experience, more than most other factors, may positively
influence perception and behaviors on different security and authentication topics. Those who
have been involved or have knowledge of others who have been involved in security attacks may
also more than others may have researched stronger forms of authentication in order to become
more secure online.
4.4.4 Traditional Passwords
Another hypothesized indicator of a person’s view of security is the number of passwords they
use.. According to Ofcom the UK communication watchdog, 55% of individuals use the same
password for most if not all websites despite that being a weak security practice. The initial
survey asked participants how many passwords they use as a gauge of their tendencies of online
security.
Figure 4.5 shows that the majority of participants claimed to use one or two unique passwords
for each of their accounts. This shows how insecure most individual’s accounts are. Using only
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Figure 4.5: Results to "How many passwords
do you use?" given in the initial survey.
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Figure 4.6: Results to "Do you think your pass-
words are secure?" given in the initial survey.
one or two passwords for one’s accounts is extremely dangerous because as soon as an attacker
knows one password they have access to an individual’s entire online identity.
The following graph shows the number of individuals who believe their passwords are secure.
Though these individuals may believe their passwords are secure, they very well may not be.
This data can only be reflective of confidence in security and single factor authentication.
The results in figure 4.6 were surprising, and suggest general overconfidence in password
protection. Only six participants out of fifty-one believed their passwords to be insecure.The team
hypothesized that these beliefs may change with Education later in the study.
The frequency at which one resets their password may be a symptom of education in stronger
authentication practices; one who understands the threats of single factor authentication may
tend towards stronger security. The question below gauges how often participants changed their
passwords:
As one can see, subjects’ habits are less than stellar. Almost all of the participants hardly
change their password, increasing the likelihood of a security breach. The team hypothesized
that this may have to do with usability; more specifically that users are not willing to put in extra
time for authentication.
4.4.5 Value of Security
The team hypothesized (and truly hopes) that belief in strong security translates to action
involving stronger security practices, such as frequency of password resetting. Subjects rated
their value of internet safety.
Figure 4.8 shows that the majority of the participants at least view security to be somewhat
significant. This result is interesting in that that the other responses, such as those in figure 4.7,
33
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
<1 1-3 >3
0
10
20
30
40
50
53
2 2
F
re
qu
en
cy
Amount of Participants vs.
Monthly Password Resets
Figure 4.7: Results to "How often do you reset
a password for an online account?" asked in the
initial survey.
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Figure 4.8: Results to "How much do you value
internet account security?" asked in the initial
survey.
seem to contradict this. Participants claimed to value internet security, yet did not have great
security practices and knowledge.
One of the objectives of the study is to better define the discrepancy between people saying
they value account security and actually acting on their value accordingly. The team addressed
this by looking for significant positive correlations between subjects’ reported value of internet
security and other factors, such as prior knowledge of 2FA, the belief that one’s passwords are not
secure, and first-hand experience with hacking. The following graph shows these comparisons:
Figure 4.91 examines the data from figure 4.8 with several other sets of data. The team
found that acquaintance with someone who was hacked had no significant effect on perception
of security (T-Test, P = 0.977). The team also found that belief in the sufficiency or insufficiency
of a password had no significant correlation with value of security (T-Test, P = 0.869), and that
prior knowledge of MFA almost had a statistically significant effect on reported value of security
(T-Test, P = 0.164).
4.4.6 Private Information
Many individuals have critical banking and social security information online that could cause
significant harm if stolen. Having vital information online may impact one’s value of security, so
as to keep information safe. Figure 4.10 shows what participants reported regarding privacy.
Figure 4.10 shows that majority of participants have private information online. The team
hypothesized that the participants who have private information online to should be more
cautious and value security more.
1Figure 4.9 Note that the graphs showing background information are highly broken down and may contain small
groups of participants.
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Figure 4.9: Responses in figure 4.8 but in respect to initial survey responses.
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asked in the initial survey.
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4.4.7 Value of Privacy
Often-times, corporations may share or sell information that users provide for advertising. Such
practices may violate one’s online privacy and can result in unwanted outcomes. The team expects
that those who value the privacy of their online information would also value internet account
security. The figure below shows participants’ reported value of their online privacy.
Figure 4.11 shows how the participants valued online privacy before they entered the study.
The majority of the participants reported that they valued it a lot, and the team believes that
participants who value it the most will also be the ones who value internet account security. This
comparison illustrates this. Even though the team earlier discovered that there is no correlation
between reported value of security, these factors may say more about value of security than what
subjects reported.
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Figure 4.12: Responses as seen in figure 4.11 but in respect to background question responses as
seen in the graph.
The results in the above graph show that most individuals (around 60%) from each subset
stated that they highly value the privacy of their online information. Most others stated that
the value they put on privacy is moderate. Despite varying differences of up to 9% of the sample
size, the team found that acquaintance with someone who had been hacked (T-Test, P = 0.270),
belief that a password is/is not enough (T-Test, P = 0.889), and prior knowledge of MFA (T-Test,
P = 0.613) had no significant correlation with value of privacy. This means that there is not a
significant difference in the subsets in the positive versus negative responses, suggesting that a
high value of privacy is not correlated with any of the three subset factors.
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4.4.8 Sufficiency of Single Factor Authentication
Ever since the online revolution started, service providers have used usernames and passwords as
authentication for online accounts. The security issues with these accounts have increased in more
recent years. The team gauged subjects’ perception of the security of single factor authentication
with the the following question under the hypothesis that education into the dangers may play a
positive role in this belief. Students were allowed to explain whether they knew of any issues or
problems that can come with these accounts.
Figure 4.13 shows that the majority of participants believed that a username and password
are not sufficient for online information. The team acknowledges that this question may have
encouraged participants to choose no simply due to the nature of the study. An interesting finding
is that of the eleven people who believed an account username and password is enough to protect
one’s online account, nine of them did not have any acquaintance with a person whose account
was hacked or compromised. Their responses may be a product of this lack of experience with the
truth of SFA security.
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Figure 4.13: Results to "Is an account user-
name and password enough to protect your on-
line accounts?" asked in the initial survey.
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line accounts?" asked in the initial survey.
4.4.9 Willingness to Spend Additional Time Authenticating
There are multiple ways to improve account security for common services. However, these
methods have a cost. For example, they may increase the time of authentication. This extra time
may be acceptable in circumstances where stronger authentication is necessary, such as banking
applications, but less so in others. The following chart assesses participants’ willingness to spend
more time authenticating.
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Figure 4.14 shows that many subjects were willing to claim that they would spend more time
on authentication. This again may not be a significant result; subjects may by default say they
are willing to spend more time. Additionally, the amounts of time subjects reported they would
be willing to spend (in some cases upwards of ten minutes) were unrealistic and suggest that the
subject did not understand the question.
4.4.10 Retention Rate of the Study
The education treatments occurred prior to the mid study evaluations. Roughly fifteen people
dropped the study after this point and never made it through the first mid-study evaluations. The
team hypothesized that education level may be a factor in retention rate. The following graphs
show the distribution of dropouts by education level and several other factors:
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Figure 4.15: Results of the participants who dropped vs their education treatment.
Figure 4.15 shows that the distribution of dropouts was nearly identical between the advanced
and baseline group. It is safe to assume that education was not a significant factor to the dropout
rate.
Figure 4.16 shows that individuals who knew someone that has been hacked or have been
hacked themselves stayed in the survey much more than those who did not know anyone who
has been hacked so much so that the team found a strong positive statistical correlation (T-
Test, P = 0.0374). The most logical incentive for individuals with acquaintance with someone
who was hacked to stay in the study is an increased motivation to use and learn about strong
authentication.
There was not much a difference between those who believed single passwords are sufficient
and those who believe passwords are insufficient. The team found that belief that a password is
sufficient/insufficient had no significant correlation with retention rate (T-Test, P = 0.852). The
team also found that prior knowledge of MFA had no significant effect on retention rate (T-Test,
P = 0.604).
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Figure 4.16: Results from figure 4.15 in respect to background traits as seen in the graph.
4.4.11 Summary of Initial Survey
The initial survey shows that a majority of individuals lack a knowledge of strong authentication.
Individuals perceive themselves to value security and privacy, but seem unaware and do not
practice basic security measures such as frequently resetting passwords or using application-
specific passwords. Many of them believe they are already secure.
4.5 Mid Study Evaluations
4.5.1 Installation Success
People use many services throughout the course of their day. Participants were asked to secure
at least two of their accounts with Authy. The team hypothesized that the initial impression of
Authy may affect perception of usability later on in the study, and that educational level may
indirectly affect the success of installations, and so the mid-study evaluations asked participants
to report how the installation went.
As illustrated in the graph above, there is a discrepancy between the responses of the advanced
and baseline groups. The team found that education level almost had a positive statistically
significant effect on the success of installation (T-Test, P = 0.163). While not assuming that a
correlation is definite, a possible explanation of this is that upon hearing more motivational
material for MFA, the advanced group put more time and effort into their installations and
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Figure 4.17: Results of "Did your installation run smoothly?" in respect to education treatment,
asked in the first mid-study survey.
therefore encountered fewer problems.
4.5.2 Frequency of Authentication
Authy requires one to authenticate oneself using a software token given by the Authy application
on one’s phone or other device. The team hypothesized that the frequency of use may affect
perception of security or usability. Following is a graph detailing how participants reported
frequency of authentication over throughout the study.
The results above may be skewed by participants failing to correctly estimate their usage of
Authy, but there are several noticeable trends. The percentage of participants who reported fewer
than five uses of Authy starts off high but decreasing, comes around and increases, and falls off
in the last survey. This may be explained by subjects using more services in weeks two and three
than earlier, then authenticating less because of Authy’s feature that remembers devices. But
perhaps the most reliable set is the percentage of subjects who did not use Authy in the previous
two weeks; it is easier to remember not using something than remembering an exact count. This
percentage can be explained the same way as earlier. One interesting occurrence is the drop in
individuals authenticating and more individuals authenticating in the 1 - 4 range during week
four. This may have been due to the winter break and some individuals not having access to the
various services they use regularly due to being off of the WPI campus.
4.5.3 Perceptions of Usability
Under the hypothesis that usability may be related to education, background, and value of privacy
and security, the team categorized participant’s observations of usability. The following graph
depicts these responses.
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Figure 4.18: Results of "How often did you use Authy to authenticate yourself in the last two
weeks?", asked in the mid-study surveys.
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Figure 4.19: Overview of responses to "What are your observations on the usability of the applica-
tion?" through out the mid study responses.
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The figure above shows the change in general perception of usability throughout the study.
These levels stay relatively constant. Although there is no obvious trend, there may be key issues
with the usability of Authy as one participant stated that they had a problem when their phone
died, leaving them unable to access their Google Drive account. Another user stated that since
they had an older version of iOS software they were unable to install Authy on their phone.
Following is more in depth analysis of the perceptions of Authy’s usability. Since there is no
obvious trend to this data, the team graphed relative responses of other questions and compared
it to perception of usability to see if this would yield significant results.
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Figure 4.20: Results in figure 4.19 in respect to education treatment.
Testing statistical significance between survey number and education level, the IQP team
found that there was no significant effect of survey number on perception of usability (ANOVA, P
= 0.981), and not quite enough evidence to support a claim of significant difference within the
education study groups (ANOVA, P = 0.207). Upon even further exploration, the team still found
no significant difference between the study groups upon direct comparison between the first and
last surveys (T-Test, P = 0.647). Therefore, perception of usability was generally not related to
level of prescribed education.
The IQP team found that there was a nearly statistically significant relationship between
perception of usability and prior knowledge of Multi-Factor Authentication (ANOVA, P = 0.160),
and no significant relationship between survey number and perception of usability (ANOVA, P
= 0.963). Therefore, there may be enough evidence to support the claim that prior knowledge
of MFA affects perception of usability. A possible explanation for this is that those with prior
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Figure 4.21: Results in figure 4.19 in respect to prior knowledge of Multi-Factor Authentication.
(figure 4.3)
knowledge of MFA already knew how the 2FA Authy System worked and what to expect, and
thus reported better usability.
Using a similar analysis, the team found that there was no significant correlation between
acquaintance with someone who was hacked, and usability. However, the result was, again, close
to being statistically significant (ANOVA, P = 0.139). Therefore, acquaintance with somebody
who was hacked may have an impact on perception of usability. A possible explanation of this
may be that those who were acquainted with someone previously hacked had more motivation to
find Authy easy to use, and therefore reported better usability.
The team found that there was not a statistically significant difference in the data to support
the claim that perception of usability is correlated with either initial view on the adequacy of a
password (ANOVA, P = 0.823) or survey number (ANOVA, P = 0.956).
4.5.4 Perceptions of Security
A service that promises to provide certain functionality must properly execute on that initiative
if is to be successful. Authy promises to secure online accounts for participants. The following
graphs show the observations on the security of Authy compared to survey number and several
background factors.
This graph shows that the overall trend of perception of security slightly increases over time.
This may have been caused by increased familiarity as time progressed. The following analysis
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Figure 4.22: Results in figure 4.19 in respect to knowledge of someone hacked. (figure 4.4)
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Figure 4.23: Results in figure 4.19 in respect to prior opinion of password sufficiency. (figure 4.6)
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Figure 4.24: Overview of responses to "What are your observations on the security Authy provides?"
through out the mid study responses.
test this observation and several others relative to the study criteria.
The IQP team analyzed the significance of the difference in study group percentage and
percentage over survey number, and determined that there is not sufficient evidence to claim
that difference in study group (ANOVA, P = 0.592) has a correlation to security observation. It
was noted that between the first and last week there is an increase in favored security, but there
is still not quite enough statistical evidence (T-Test, P = 0.199) to support a claim that survey
number is a significant enough factor to explain the difference. Therefore, neither survey number
nor education level have a significant correlation to perception of security.
Upon statistical analysis, there are no statistically significant correlations between prior
knowledge and perception of security (ANOVA, P = 0.166) or survey number and perception
of security (ANOVA, P = 0.987). It should be noted that prior knowledge of MFA is close to
being statistically significant, and therefore may have an effect on perception of security. An
explanation for this is that subjects with first or second hand experience with being hacked may
directly see the threat of weak authentication and therefore report higher security with a strong
authentication outlet.
The team found no statistically significant correlation between either survey number and
perception of security (ANOVA, P = 0.991), or acquaintance with somebody hacked and perception
of security (ANOVA, P = 0.480). Acquaintance to somebody hacked and survey number are not
significant factors in predicting perception of security.
The team found that there was not a statistically significant difference to support the claim
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Figure 4.25: Results in figure 4.24 in respect to education treatment.
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Figure 4.26: Results in figure 4.24 in respect to prior knowledge of Multi-Factor Authentication.
(figure 4.3)
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Figure 4.27: Results in figure 4.24 in respect to knowledge of someone hacked. (figure 4.4)
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Figure 4.28: Results in figure 4.24 in respect to prior opinion of password sufficiency. (figure 4.6)
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that perception of security is impacted by either initial view on the adequacy of a password
(ANOVA, P = 0.874) or survey number (ANOVA, P = 0.984).
4.5.5 Perceptions of Privacy
An application that desires to be trustworthy and maintain a good relationship with their users
will not share private data. Following are the observations that participants reported about
privacy compared with survey number and several background factors.
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Figure 4.29: Overview of responses to "What are your observations on the privacy of Authy?"
through out the mid study responses.
The general trend for overall perception of privacy relative to Authy is a static highly favorable
percentage over the entire survey. Subjects had an unchanging view that Authy kept their
information private.
The team analyzed the results above and found no statistically significant evidence to support
a claim that survey number (ANOVA, P = 0.999) or education level (ANOVA, P = 0.653) plays a
role in explaining differences in privacy observations. Neither education level nor survey number
had an impact on perception of privacy.
The team found that there is no statistically significant correlation between either survey
number and perception of privacy (ANOVA, P = 0.997) or prior knowledge of MFA and perception
of security (ANOVA, P = 0.321). Neither prior knowledge of MFA nor survey number had a
significant impact on perception of privacy.
The team found no statistical evidence to suggest that perception of privacy is impacted
by either survey number (ANOVA, P = 0.996) or acquaintance with someone who was hacked
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Figure 4.30: Results in figure 4.29 in respect to education treatment.
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Figure 4.31: Results in figure 4.29 in respect to prior knowledge of Multi-Factor Authentication.
(figure 4.3)
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Figure 4.32: Results in figure 4.29 in respect to knowledge of someone hacked. (figure 4.4)
(ANOVA, P = 0.596).
The team found that there was not a statistically significant difference to support the claim
that perception of usability is impacted by either initial view on the adequacy of a password
(ANOVA, P = 0.857) or survey number (ANOVA, P = 0.994).
4.5.6 Difficulties with Authy
The team hypothesized that education level may be a factor in predicting whether subjects had
difficulties or not. Throughout the course of the study if an individual experienced difficulties
they were asked to note it describe the problem. The following graph shows the percentages of
individuals that have had issues with Authy over the course of the study by education level.
The preceding graph shows the trend of difficulties as time went on in the study. As survey
number increased, the number of difficulties participants encountered decreased. Intuitively it
makes sense that most of the issues occurred at the beginning of the survey, while very few if
none occurred at the end. However, the differences in percentage between the educational groups
is minimal, and it can be assumed that education does not play a role in difficulties with Authy.
4.5.7 Summary of Mid-Study
The team measured subjects’ perceptions of security, usability, and privacy throughout the mid-
study phase. Upon comparison of these perceptions with education level and other background
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Figure 4.33: Results in figure 4.29 in respect to prior opinion of password sufficiency. (figure 4.6)
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Figure 4.34: Responses to "Have you experienced any difficulty with Authy?" in respect to educa-
tion treatment.
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indicators, the team found little significant correlation. The only significant background factor
was prior knowledge of MFA, which proved to be a positive indicator of usability perception. This
evidence leads the team to conclude that either a more in-depth education or a larger number of
participants may have had a larger impact. However, the fact is that the education that the IQP
team gave, prior experience with MFA, password preferences, and a past with security attacks do
not have a significant effect on the subjects’ perception of Strong Authentication.
4.6 Final Survey
4.6.1 Perception of Protection
Two factor authentication promises stronger security than single factor password authentication.
Under the hypothesis that perception of protection may be related to education and other
background factors, the team assessed the former in the Final survey:
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Figure 4.35: Responses to "How protected did you feel when using Two Factor Authentication?"
in respect to education treatment and initial survey responses.
As seen in Figure 4.53, subjects tended to feel a sense of increased protection with Authy.
Upon further analysis, the team found that education level (ANOVA, P = 0.829), acquaintance
with someone hacked (ANOVA, P = 0.658), initial perception on the adequacy of passwords
(ANOVA, P = 0.815), and prior knowledge of MFA (ANOVA, P = 0.505) had no effect on how
protected users felt with Authy.
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4.6.2 Usability Conclusions
As stated prior, a device or application that provides a poor user experience or user interface has
a higher chance of no longer being used or being labeled as horrible. In the final survey students
were asked to rate the overall usability of Authy under the hypothesis that background factors or
education may have a correlation with overall usability conclusions.
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Figure 4.36: Responses to "Rate the overall usability of Authy." in respect to education treatment
and initial survey responses.
As seen in the graph above, most participants stated that Authy had generally good usability.
Across the board, around 60% of individuals reported good usability, with most others stating
that the usability was okay. This led the team to believe that Authy’s implementation of Two
Factor Authentication is well and usable. However, the team found that education level (ANOVA,
P = 0.735), acquaintance with someone who was hacked, (ANOVA, P = 0.561), initial belief on the
adequacy of a password (ANOVA, P = 0.843), and prior knowledge of MFA (ANOVA, P = 0.417)
had no significant effect on the final perception of usability. Some further usability concerns were
reported in the final survey, for example, one user stated that Authy was more “cumbersome”
than SMS 2FA and complained it did not support Android wear.
4.6.3 Confidence in Privacy
The team asked the participants to report how private Authy keeps their information under the
hypothesis that education level and other background factors may have significant correlations
with confidence in privacy.
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Figure 4.37: Responses to "How confident are you that Authy keeps your data safe and private?"
in respect to education treatment and initial survey responses.
Figure 4.37 shows that the majority of subjects are very confident that Authy keeps their
information safe and private. An average of roughly 68% of individuals across the board believe
this to be true. However, the team found that acquaintance with someone who was hacked
(T-Test, P = 0.645), initial impression on the adequacy of a password (T-Test, P = 0.728), prior
knowledge of MFA (T-Test, P = 0.342), and education (T-Test, P = 0.416) had no significant impact
on confidence in Authy privacy-wise.
4.6.4 Perception Change
Under the hypothesis that education may have an impact on how much subjects’ opinions on
Strong Authentication changed, the team asked a question to detail just that:
As shown by the figure above 77.7% of individuals in the baseline group believe their per-
ceptions of authentication changed a lot during the course of the study, while only 56.5% of the
Advanced group believed their perceptions to have changed. The team found that Education level
almost had a statistically significant impact on whether or not subjects’ opinions changed over
the study (T-Test, P = 0.128). This may be a product of how the advanced group had received
more education at the beginning of the study and resultingly had to figure out less about authen-
tication on their own. This result contradicts some of the results from the mid-study evaluations;
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individuals often reported no change in opinion or similar responses between surveys. Their
perceptions may not have changed as much as they thought.
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Figure 4.38: Responses to "Did your percep-
tion of authentication change throughout this
study?" in respect to education treatment.
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Figure 4.39: Responses to "Do you think you
will continue using Authy outside of this study?"
in respect to education treatment.
4.6.5 Continued Use of Authy
A good indicator of the relative importance of security to usability is continued use. The team
asked subjects to state whether or not they plan to use Authy or another type of 2FA under the
hypothesis that educational awareness may cause a significant effect.
According to the above graph above, most individuals in the study believed that they will
continue to use Authy once this study is complete. Education level does not seem to be relevant
in this case as both parties reported with nearly identical distributions. The statistical analysis
supports this conclusion as well (T-Test, P = 0.815). Another interesting result is that subjects
who think that they would not use Authy in the future had not experienced a computer account
being hacked or compromised. Not having experienced with a cyber security attack may make
those students think that Authy is not necessary.
4.6.6 Participants Technical Understanding of Authy
The team asked participants to explain how Authy protects them, under the hypothesis that
education group and other background factors may have a significant relation to understanding
of Authy’s 2FA mechanism.
Based on the data above, the team found that education does not have a statistically significant
impact on how well participants defined the 2FA mechanism (ANOVA, P = 0.670).
55
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
High Average Little None
0
10
20
30
40
50
44.4
38.8
0
16.6
52.1
17.3
13
17.3Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Percentage of Education Level
vs. Understanding of Authy 2FA
Baseline Advanced
Figure 4.40: Responses to "Is Two Factor Au-
thentication, as provided by Authy, more secure
than a password?" in respect to education.
Nothing Some A lot
0
20
40
60
80
100
5.5
94.4
0
4.3
73.9
21.7
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Percentage of Education Level
vs. Amount of Security Learned
Baseline Advanced
Figure 4.41: Responses to "Did you learn any-
thing about internet security throughout this
study?" in respect to education.
4.6.7 Knowledge Learned About Internet Security
Throughout the course of the study participants had much exposure to strong authentication
concepts. The team gauged whether or not students felt as though they had learned anything
throughout the course of the study under the pretense that education impacted the reported
amount learned.
According to data above, most individuals in the study believe they learned at least a lit-
tle about internet account security. However, the team found that there was no statistically
significant difference between the results for each education level (ANOVA, P = 0.831).
One of the requirements in the study was that students install Authy for at least two services.
The team hypothesized that education level may have a role, and that if subjects went beyond
two, they must have a good perception of strong authentication.
The team found a highly statistically significant negative correlation between number of
services and education level (i.e. you are far more likely to have three or fewer services installed
if you are in the higher education group) (T-Test, P < 0.01). This may be caused by increased
curiosity from the baseline group, or by something in the presentations themselves.
4.6.8 Other Forms of Multi-Factor Authentication
The team hypothesized that education level may be a significant factor in perception of strong
authentication, so the final survey polled subjects on how they plan to proceed in the future with
strong authentication. The following graph summarizes the data.
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Figure 4.42: Responses to "Did you install Au-
thy for more than the two services we asked for?"
in respect to education.
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Figure 4.43: Responses to "Did you install any
other methods of Strong Authentication and/or
do you plan to?" in respect to education.
The team found that; education played a significant positive role in the difference between
responses (T-Test, P = 0.0619). This result may be explained by the education level, as those in
the advanced group received more education on different strong authentication methods and may
be interested in trying them out.
4.6.9 Final Survey Summary
The results of the final survey show that most subjects felt as though the usability, security, and
privacy of Authy was great. Users’ overall perceptions are positive after using the application,
and most individuals stated that they will continue using Authy after the study is over. This
suggests that although the initial barriers to 2FA may be more inconvenient than those of single
factor password authentication, the payoff is increased safety, and more importantly, confidence
in safety and privacy generally without inconvenient usability issues. The results of the final
survey also show that most individuals believe that they not only learned during the study but
their perceptions of strong authentication changed greatly. However, the team discovered little
significance in terms of cause and effect relationships between factors. Education was significant
to perception of 2FA in two instances, but prior knowledge of MFA, opinion on the adequacy of
passwords, and acquaintance with someone hacked all demonstrably had no effect.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 The Study
As part of the goals of this IQP, the team wanted to understand user perception of Strong
Authentication, as influenced by several factors measured while using a strong authentication
system. The IQP team designed a study in which participants were recruited with a cash incentive
and split into two groups with different levels of educational treatment: baseline and advanced
education. These groups were designed to illicit any differences in behavior and perception to
discover if education affects a user’s decision-making processes regarding strong authentication.
The participants were required to install a third party two-factor application called Authy, connect
it to at least two services, and complete five bi-weekly surveys designed to track perceptions of
the application’s usability, security, and privacy over time. The team later analyzed how these
factors affected subjects’ choices in using two-factor authentication.
5.2 Key Findings
The team discovered several trends about people’s experiences with authentication, particularly
in the area of individual background, education level, and experience in the study.
One overall trend was that although people claimed to value security and privacy, they did
not use basic important security practices. This implies that although people may want to be
secure, they are unwilling or unaware of how to take the necessary steps to achieve that security.
The team assessed the mid-study survey data, focusing on education and specific background
qualities. While searching for correlations, the team found that education level and several
other background had little to no significance. One of the few existing correlations, however,
was between prior knowledge of MFA and perception of usability. The team found that those
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who understood MFA prior to the study tended to favor the usability of Authy. This correlation
strongly shows that some form of education on MFA may result in better perceptions of 2FA
usability.
The initial barriers to 2FA are more inconvenient than those of a single password. The team
found that after the initial difficulty (or chemistry analogy "activation energy"), students viewed
the security, privacy, and usability of 2FA as implemented by Authy very positively to the extent
that many subjects stated they would continue to use it after the study was completed.
5.3 Recommendations
There are a number of things that could have been done to improve the effectiveness of the study.
For those who are interested in finding out more about how human motivation works when
it comes to strong authentication, this section states what the team believes may be done to
improve upon the work done in this study. This section also recommendations to developers and
companies the team and the participants of the study believe should be put into place to improve
upon the current security software for Strong Authentication.
5.3.1 Future Research
The team found that the education did not have as much impact as expected. This result was
surprising, as it contradicts the correlation proven earlier that knowledge of MFA predicts
higher perception of usability. It may be due to the fact that the team gave the subjects only one
30-60 minute session to learn about Strong Authentication, which may not have been enough
to cover the in-depth topic. The team recommends to have a larger scope of the educational
sessions, perhaps spread over several days, or even having recurring weekly or bi-weekly sessions.
Education did have a small effect, and knowledge of MFA (which had to be learned somehow!)
was shown to be significant in the mid study evaluations. If prior knowledge of MFA was shown
to be significant to perception of Strong Authentication, then other topics may also be significant
with a more extensive prescribed education. The way to test this hypothesis would to be to provide
more extensive education to participants during the study.
The highest number of recorded individuals at a single time was fifty-seven. This population
size may not be enough to accurately detect important trends discussed throughout the analysis.
For several comparison figures, the group size in one category was smaller than desired. This
issue may be fixed by more participation in the study. More participants means more data, which
may lead to strongly supported correlations and more unique qualitative phenomena. Either way,
upscaling the participant pool may improve the credibility of the conclusions in a study such as
this.
The mid study survey phase was designed to help the IQP team understand how perceptions
of strong authentication changed over the course of the study. Unfortunately, the overall trends
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from this data were not as defined or clear the team had hoped. Many graphs showed little to no
change over the entire 10 week period. To get better data out of a mid-study evaluation period
such as this, the team recommends extending the length of time to catch larger trends that 10
weeks may not spot.
With this study design, survey questions were critical to getting usable data. The responses
are critical data points that are used in making analysis and acquiring results. One must make
sure that any questions asked are clear and prompt the participant to be descriptive and honest
about their perceptions. The team recommends that future work should be very specific about
honest feedback and should design questions with the expectation that subjects will say what
they think is the "correct" choice, rather than what they actually believe.
The team also recommends that further work be done using alternate authentication methods,
perhaps a different software token application such as Google Authenticator, or by using a
hardware token such as a yubikey. The broader the data collected, the more thorough analyses
can be made.
Because of the resources available to the IQP team, all of the study participants were
WPI students. WPI is known for being a technically competent community; many students
are accustomed to technology and some even to security practices and techniques. The team
recommends that future related work uses a more diverse participant body. People of different
ages, occupations, and locations may give a more honest reflection of the truth.
A final suggestion to future researchers would be to set aside time and meet with participants
face to face in focus groups. If participants discuss how they perceive authentication, they will
have thought more about the topic and may resultingly be able to give better responses.
5.3.2 Other Recommendation
According to the aforementioned results, the so-called "activation energy" when beginning to
use strong authentication may be part of the reason for its lack of widespread usage. The team
recommends that online services, schools, and other organizations mandate some form of strong
authentication to spread its knowledge and usage.
Many students had concerns and difficulties when installing and linking their services to
third-party 2FA application used in this study. Companies may benefit by having clear, foolproof
installation guides. If the barrier of entry is too high, few will put in the work to secure themselves
using the application. Also supporting more services that individuals use frequently is important
to making sure that all parts of an individual’s online identity and activity is secured.
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